Katrina & temporary housing: lessons learned from Kobe
The following comments were originally posted on PLANET in response to Peter Marcuse's comment now posted on this forum under the topic, Planning for Katrina recovery. Rob Olshansky, the author, has given permission for the posting.
Thanks, Peter (Marcuse). The temporary housing arrangements are critical, because they set the foundation for everything else. Unfortunately, so far there is little evidence that this is being done with any thought or strategy. But it's still not too late. Though I'm not sure to what extent any of us can have meaningful imput. Some of the biggest lessons from the Kobe earthquake involve temporary housing (they had 48,000 temporary housing units). Translated to the New Orleans case these would be:
1. For those who want to return to New Orleans, it is critical that they be housed as close to their old homes as possible. When jobs reappear (when downtown and tourism restart, which should be relatively soon), they will be in a position to take those jobs. For those who don't want to return, I suppose they could avoid temporary housing altogether and instead take housing vouchers for new homes in other cities.
2. As Peter suggests, it is also important that they be together with their neighbors. That way, they can retain their social ties (an important aspect of recovery), conduct community planning processes, and share information and resources to help rebuild their homes and lives.
3. It is important to get beyond mere counting of housing units. These are places where people will live. And there is no avoiding the fact that they will be depressing places. But this can be mitigated. They need proximity to stores and services, served by temporary transit systems if needed. They need medical care. They need lots of counseling services and other support services. They also need entertainment (think of troops in encampments overseas).
4. In short, there are two important aspects to temporary housing. The first is that it is temporary. This means that they need to have adequate support services aimed at transitioning people out of the settlements and into permanent homes, jobs, and communities. The second is that, despite being temporary, it will be a home to many people for two to four years. This means that they must be made as livable as possible, with sufficient amenities to maintain people's mental health and spirits.
--Rob Olshansky
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Who's to Blame for Poor Infrastructure?
The following post was sent in by John G. Howard (jhoward at ci.charlotte.nc.us).
Who's to Blame for Poor Infrastructure?
Hurricane Katrina revealed a vulnerable side of the most propserous nation in the world. Howcan we explain the lack of funding for basic infrastructure in urban and rural communities?
This editorial was written in the year 2000 about the effects of Hurricane Floyd on a poor, rural community in eastern North Carolina. The hirrican struck the eastern shore the year before. The author makes us aware of important social and planning issues such as the lack of funding for basic public services, the lack of economic development in rural towns, political interest (or dis-interest) and the needs of Americans who live in poverty, particluarly in dubious geographies.
"With few businesses other than mom-and-pop-type stores and a low tax base, water rates were high and basic services--like garbage pickup--were, at times, nonexistent. The drainage system was clogged and overrun; in heavy rain, water backups and drainage problems were common. The town's location didn't help: Because low-lying Princeville was situated downstream on the Tar River, it flooded seven times between 1800 and 1958."
After The Flood - Princeville, North Carolina, recovers from flooding caused by Hurricane Floyd in 1999